The Realist: Iranian Grand Strategy
A textbook realist reading of Ahmadinejad's Grand Strategy from an email subscription service I receive, Stratfor. I recommend signing up for their free updates. I know the post is long, but it's worth checking out at length if you have the time:
"Tehran has been maneuvering for years to secure certain interests in the region. First and foremost, of course, is the country's own national security, for which the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad was a prerequisite. With the establishment of a friendly (or at least neutral), Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad, Iran would be able to both secure the primary goal of security and be well down the path toward a secondary and equally desirable goal: regional hegemony.
Therefore, an Iranian strategy began emerging almost from the moment the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad fell in April 2003. The strategy has revolved around shaping events in the region and, crucially, external perceptions of Iran and its leadership. The chief tactics employed have been manipulation of political events in Iraq, a vocal emphasis on Iran's nuclear program, skillful use of politically incorrect (at times, seemingly maniacal) statements by Ahmadinejad, the activation of regional proxies and, above all, patience. Stratfor has explored many of these tactics in detail before, but we will recap them here briefly as the strategy, viewed in full, is quite something to behold.
Let's begin with the most potent part of the strategy (both politically and militarily): the nuclear program.
Iran clearly has used this as a bargaining chip in the back channel dealings over Iraq. Rather than pursuing a covert nuclear program -- which has been the logical course if obtaining nuclear weapons were truly Iran's primary goal in the beginning -- the Iranians made a conscious decision to tout their nuclear advances publicly. Their political and energy partners in Moscow and Beijing routinely have played defense, ensuring that the nuclear issue languishes in the U.N. Security Council. And Tehran has made sure to crank up the rhetoric whenever political developments in Iraq take an unfavorable turn -- while always staying clear of the red line (beyond which the United States or Israel could be expected to mount pre-emptive strikes). This tactic has helped shape perceptions of Iran as a force to be reckoned with, while keeping Washington and its allies off balance in negotiations over Iraq. And, significantly, nuclear weapons no longer appear to be a red herring tactic, but an end of themselves for Tehran.
Closely related to this has been the image campaign for Ahmadinejad, who has been carefully and purposely branded in the public mind as an utter lunatic. The nearly unknown, populist mayor from Tehran was captured in the public spotlight during Iran's 2005 summer election season. Before the world could even begin to form an opinion of him, he began threatening to wipe Israel off the map, labeling the Holocaust an enormous lie and so forth. As North Korea's experiments with the "crazy fearsome cripple gambit" have showed, an otherwise weak state -- headed by a seemingly wild-eyed leader who just might be mad enough to launch some of the nukes that the state may or may not actually possess -- can gain useful concessions, if not respect, from the rest of the world. And in Iran's case, it certainly made Israel and the United States to think twice about whether to attempt any military adventures concerning the Islamic Republic.
Tehran has shown itself equally effective in its use of militant proxies in the region.
The financial, ideological, political and military support of Iran has helped Hezbollah build a strong following among the mostly poor Shiite population of southern Lebanon. Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the Shiite militant group was left languishing -- provoking the occasional border skirmish with Israel as a way of maintaining its credibility. But over the summer, while the world was focused on Iraq, Hezbollah roared back to life in a conflict that went well beyond a border skirmish.
There is reason to believe Iran had a hand in igniting that conflict. In early July, when long-range missiles began raining down on Haifa, sources within Hezbollah hinted to Stratfor that the launch had taken them by surprise -- indicating something more than a routine kidnapping of Israeli soldiers that garnered unintended consequences. Hezbollah forces certainly took a beating during the 34-day conflict, but the important point is that the militant group successfully resisted the Israeli military.
This outcome has purchased long-term benefits for both Hezbollah and Iran. On the micro level, it has attracted new levels of support for Hezbollah and engendered a new sense of confidence within the movement -- which is now moving to expand its political clout through massive street demonstrations in Beirut, designed to bring down the government controlled by its opponents. On the macro level, the outcome of the conflict left Israel in military and political paralysis -- providing Iran with even more room to maneuver politically within the region.
In addition to Hezbollah, Iran has kept in close touch with its Shiite proxies in Bahrain and Kuwait -- a quiet reminder to Sunni Arab states in the region that Tehran retains the means to destabilize their neighborhoods, as it did Israel's, should circumstances compel it. Iran's rising influence in the region has put the Arab regimes on a defensive footing, and some are now questioning the wisdom of strategies that rely on U.S. military strength to secure their interests. It is for this reason, then, that Saudi Arabia is now hinting it will step up support for Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have announced plans to launch a joint nuclear program (ostensibly for civilian energy purposes). The Sunni states lack strong military capabilities of their own, but will shout as loudly as possible to make it clear to the United States that they will not sit idly by while Iran recasts the region's balance of power in favor of the Shia.
All of these tactics, of course, hit around the periphery of what is really the first and most crucial issue: Iraq. It is there that Iran's political manipulations, its use of proxies and its great patience -- as the poor position of U.S. troops and of the U.S. president both grew increasingly evident -- have come into play. And with its growing confidence in the region, Iran seemingly has become less inclined to settle for merely a friendly or neutral government in Baghdad. Instead, it wants control.
As expected, October turned out to be a particularly deadly month for U.S. forces in Iraq, with Iran helping to fuel attacks by its Shiite militant proxies. These Iranian-sponsored rebels are an assortment of militants, many of whom received training from Hezbollah cadres in Lebanon. Iran also has enlisted rogue elements from Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's movement to aid in this effort. The timing of the uptick in American casualties played into the U.S. political cycle -- as the Iranians could have predicted -- and contributed to the Republican upset in November's U.S. congressional elections. At the same time, already loud demands for the Bush administration to shift course or construct a real policy for Iraq gained even greater volume.
In keeping with the strategy, Washington now is feeling pressure from all sides to engage Tehran -- and, crucially, the Iranians have had to sacrifice nothing to achieve this position."
"Tehran has been maneuvering for years to secure certain interests in the region. First and foremost, of course, is the country's own national security, for which the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad was a prerequisite. With the establishment of a friendly (or at least neutral), Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad, Iran would be able to both secure the primary goal of security and be well down the path toward a secondary and equally desirable goal: regional hegemony.
Therefore, an Iranian strategy began emerging almost from the moment the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad fell in April 2003. The strategy has revolved around shaping events in the region and, crucially, external perceptions of Iran and its leadership. The chief tactics employed have been manipulation of political events in Iraq, a vocal emphasis on Iran's nuclear program, skillful use of politically incorrect (at times, seemingly maniacal) statements by Ahmadinejad, the activation of regional proxies and, above all, patience. Stratfor has explored many of these tactics in detail before, but we will recap them here briefly as the strategy, viewed in full, is quite something to behold.
Let's begin with the most potent part of the strategy (both politically and militarily): the nuclear program.
Iran clearly has used this as a bargaining chip in the back channel dealings over Iraq. Rather than pursuing a covert nuclear program -- which has been the logical course if obtaining nuclear weapons were truly Iran's primary goal in the beginning -- the Iranians made a conscious decision to tout their nuclear advances publicly. Their political and energy partners in Moscow and Beijing routinely have played defense, ensuring that the nuclear issue languishes in the U.N. Security Council. And Tehran has made sure to crank up the rhetoric whenever political developments in Iraq take an unfavorable turn -- while always staying clear of the red line (beyond which the United States or Israel could be expected to mount pre-emptive strikes). This tactic has helped shape perceptions of Iran as a force to be reckoned with, while keeping Washington and its allies off balance in negotiations over Iraq. And, significantly, nuclear weapons no longer appear to be a red herring tactic, but an end of themselves for Tehran.
Closely related to this has been the image campaign for Ahmadinejad, who has been carefully and purposely branded in the public mind as an utter lunatic. The nearly unknown, populist mayor from Tehran was captured in the public spotlight during Iran's 2005 summer election season. Before the world could even begin to form an opinion of him, he began threatening to wipe Israel off the map, labeling the Holocaust an enormous lie and so forth. As North Korea's experiments with the "crazy fearsome cripple gambit" have showed, an otherwise weak state -- headed by a seemingly wild-eyed leader who just might be mad enough to launch some of the nukes that the state may or may not actually possess -- can gain useful concessions, if not respect, from the rest of the world. And in Iran's case, it certainly made Israel and the United States to think twice about whether to attempt any military adventures concerning the Islamic Republic.
Tehran has shown itself equally effective in its use of militant proxies in the region.
The financial, ideological, political and military support of Iran has helped Hezbollah build a strong following among the mostly poor Shiite population of southern Lebanon. Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the Shiite militant group was left languishing -- provoking the occasional border skirmish with Israel as a way of maintaining its credibility. But over the summer, while the world was focused on Iraq, Hezbollah roared back to life in a conflict that went well beyond a border skirmish.
There is reason to believe Iran had a hand in igniting that conflict. In early July, when long-range missiles began raining down on Haifa, sources within Hezbollah hinted to Stratfor that the launch had taken them by surprise -- indicating something more than a routine kidnapping of Israeli soldiers that garnered unintended consequences. Hezbollah forces certainly took a beating during the 34-day conflict, but the important point is that the militant group successfully resisted the Israeli military.
This outcome has purchased long-term benefits for both Hezbollah and Iran. On the micro level, it has attracted new levels of support for Hezbollah and engendered a new sense of confidence within the movement -- which is now moving to expand its political clout through massive street demonstrations in Beirut, designed to bring down the government controlled by its opponents. On the macro level, the outcome of the conflict left Israel in military and political paralysis -- providing Iran with even more room to maneuver politically within the region.
In addition to Hezbollah, Iran has kept in close touch with its Shiite proxies in Bahrain and Kuwait -- a quiet reminder to Sunni Arab states in the region that Tehran retains the means to destabilize their neighborhoods, as it did Israel's, should circumstances compel it. Iran's rising influence in the region has put the Arab regimes on a defensive footing, and some are now questioning the wisdom of strategies that rely on U.S. military strength to secure their interests. It is for this reason, then, that Saudi Arabia is now hinting it will step up support for Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have announced plans to launch a joint nuclear program (ostensibly for civilian energy purposes). The Sunni states lack strong military capabilities of their own, but will shout as loudly as possible to make it clear to the United States that they will not sit idly by while Iran recasts the region's balance of power in favor of the Shia.
All of these tactics, of course, hit around the periphery of what is really the first and most crucial issue: Iraq. It is there that Iran's political manipulations, its use of proxies and its great patience -- as the poor position of U.S. troops and of the U.S. president both grew increasingly evident -- have come into play. And with its growing confidence in the region, Iran seemingly has become less inclined to settle for merely a friendly or neutral government in Baghdad. Instead, it wants control.
As expected, October turned out to be a particularly deadly month for U.S. forces in Iraq, with Iran helping to fuel attacks by its Shiite militant proxies. These Iranian-sponsored rebels are an assortment of militants, many of whom received training from Hezbollah cadres in Lebanon. Iran also has enlisted rogue elements from Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's movement to aid in this effort. The timing of the uptick in American casualties played into the U.S. political cycle -- as the Iranians could have predicted -- and contributed to the Republican upset in November's U.S. congressional elections. At the same time, already loud demands for the Bush administration to shift course or construct a real policy for Iraq gained even greater volume.
In keeping with the strategy, Washington now is feeling pressure from all sides to engage Tehran -- and, crucially, the Iranians have had to sacrifice nothing to achieve this position."
posted by James at 12:07 AM
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