Bush and Bismarck

I am in the process of researching/composing a paper on the similarities between Bismarck's Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and Bush's Iraq War of 2003, particularly concerning the use of rapid, psychologically-crippling warfare in each conflict--"shock and awe" tactics. I just stumbled across this quote, which reflects pretty closely the shift that occurred in the Bush Administration after 9/11. It's an obvious point, but hearing it said in regards to the 1866 war makes the historical similarities between Bismarck and Bush of all the more interest: "After 1866, the example of Könnigrätz suggested that Prussia-Germany could extend its influence... against any rival if only it struck fast and hard enough...While other powers tended to view war as a question of 'defense,' the Germans, after 1866, came to relish its offensive potentialities."

John Gaddis turned me on to this comparison in his "Surprise, Security and the American Experience" and also in a 2005 piece in Foreign Affairs.