I'll be back after a short trip to Guatemala. Happy New Years!

What this war in Somalia has reminded us, if nothing else, is that the doctrine of jihad is alive and well far outside of the Arab world and the 'Stans. Here for interesting information on the mostly forgotten, but increasingly nasty, jihad in Thailand.

I'm a bit behind when it comes to bling culture, but my limited research indicates that rappers have moved from bragging about their cars to bragging about their planes. Am I mistaken? What's next? Spaceships?

"I say I got a benz so you said me too
You hangin out the window so they can see you
But you ain't hangin out the window when you in that G2
Or that G3 or G4 like we do"

- Clipse


Also, isn't it a bad idea to stick your head out the window of an airplane?

Some interesting stories of the week that Ford's death has covered up in the media...

1. Hamas threatens to attack the U.S. (!)

2. Ahmadinejad wries a letter to the Pope. (!) I think someone should collect these letters and publish them in comic book format...

3. Prince Harry is on his way to Iraq. (!)

A Great Christmas Present

This would have been a good one: a US Army skateboard. Real hip.

Nuts

The NRA's comic book.

So you don't mistake Machiavelli's thoughts for my own, here are two touching pieces on the lives of ordinary Iraqis caught up in this war. I would also recommend checking out some of the very good blogs out there written by Iraqis. For now, here and here.

Machiavelli and the Kagans

Merry Christmas!

A thought I had while struggling through last night (I just had surgery on my left shoulder and spend my time either in great pain or delirious on painkillers): it seems to me that the Kagans' (father and son Fred) mission vis a vis this war has been to revitalize Machiavelli's distinction between the feared and the hated prince: the ruler must strive to be feared, but avoid being hated at all costs--a fine line to walk. Our refusal to make this distinction, however, has left us with a completely ineffectual security policy for Iraq: we are so afraid of being hated that we cannot effectively convince the insurgents we are adequately powerful and committed to destroy them. We need a bigger footprint in Iraq exactly to do so, while at the same time providing the necessary infrastructure and services to keep us from being despised.

I'm not attributing these thoughts directly to the Kagans, but in my percocet-induced haze last night this Machiavelli-model came to mind as a useful way to think about how they've seen this war from the beginning.

Somalia

Those pushing the idea of Somalia as the new Afghanistan are failing to take into account two important facts: first, the UIC's stated ambivalence to the ends of Al Qaeda and second, the Ethiopia factor: Ethiopia simply will not allow a full-blown Islamist state to emerge on its eastern border. With that said, I believe this war with Ethiopia, if the UIC emerges alive, will be enough to fully radicalize it into a Taliban-style faction, particularly if the U.S. openly supports Ethiopia. Indeed, it will be interesting to see how much this war, which is developing as I write, will become the new jihad of vogue, with foreign fighters streaming in to help the embattled Somalis. While Bin Laden did recently include Darfur on his list of sites of interest to the global jihadist, Al Qaeda--as far as I'm aware--hasn't had much of a presence in East Africa since Bin Laden's exile fronm Sudan in 1996. But if Bin Laden does help the UIC fight Ethiopia, it's likely that Al Qaeda will be granted some degree of operational freedom and security within Somalia in the years to come. Even more interesting, as I've commented in this space before, the UIC has been sending men to Lebanon to be trained by Hezbollah. The secular government at Baidoa obviously needs our support, but the extent to which this translates into outright support for Ethiopia must be carefully considered. If we do support Ethiopia (I don't think we have a choice) we must do so subtly. At best, this scenario promises an extremely bloody and nasty regional war in the Horn of Africa. At worst, it promises an extremely bloody and nasty regional war in the Horn of Africa with an isolated, bitter, and devastated Islamist Somalia emerging out of its ashes, mindful of how the U.S. helped contribute to its destruction.

Hegel on Love

As a friend reminded me today, we'd all be a lot less selfish and closed to others if we read our Hegel. And, as I plowed through The Philosophy of Right for my senior essay project on self-actualization, freedom, and ethical naturalism in Hegel and Marx, I came across this stunning passage:

"But we already possess this freedom in the form of feeling [Empfindung], for example in friendship and love. Here, we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human being should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains self-awareness only by regarding the other as other" (§7).

Remember the Family Circus?

Thank you to Mina for the hilarious link.

Gore Gore Gore

I still think he's the best bet.

From the London Times.

"As even embarrassed Iranians realise, the conference is a disgrace, a grotesque attempt to relativise, if not deny, a crime against humanity. Far from giving those in the Middle East a chance to discuss this historical event (a chance all too rarely given in their own countries), the organisers have already censored the proceedings by denying a visa to an outspoken Palestin-ian lawyer who said that denials of the “monstrous horror” harmed the Palestinian cause.

He is right. For it is not simply that the denial or playing down of the Holocaust will, as Amos Oz, the liberal Israeli writer, said, “be received with revulsion and disgust everywhere in the world”; it makes the terrible mistake of justifying criticism of Israel by denying the historical fact so crucial to the state’s founding. The more thoughtful Palestinians have already understood that the refusal to acknowledge the wartime persecution of the Jews gives credibility to the assertion that critics of Israel are motivated by anti-Semitism. Iran’s President simply proves the point. He has labelled Israel a “tumour” that should be “wiped from the face of the Earth”."

Bush & The Kagans

Looks like Bush might take seriously the recommendations the Kagans have been offering for years: more troops, more troops, more troops. The Kagan family is always kicking around Yale, and I've recently had dinner with father and son (Don and Fred). They remain adamant that only a significantly larger American footprint in Iraq, coupled with an overall increase in the size of the U.S. military, offers any hope to pacify the country. Could this strategy still work? Perhaps in '03 or '04, but now? I think it might be worth a shot. I find Yglesias's take on it petulant and ill-reasoned: I'm always surprised by how litle worthwhile he has say to say about Iraq, while still keeping up an otherwise great blog...

The Realist: Iranian Grand Strategy

A textbook realist reading of Ahmadinejad's Grand Strategy from an email subscription service I receive, Stratfor. I recommend signing up for their free updates. I know the post is long, but it's worth checking out at length if you have the time:

"Tehran has been maneuvering for years to secure certain interests in the region. First and foremost, of course, is the country's own national security, for which the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad was a prerequisite. With the establishment of a friendly (or at least neutral), Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad, Iran would be able to both secure the primary goal of security and be well down the path toward a secondary and equally desirable goal: regional hegemony.

Therefore, an Iranian strategy began emerging almost from the moment the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad fell in April 2003. The strategy has revolved around shaping events in the region and, crucially, external perceptions of Iran and its leadership. The chief tactics employed have been manipulation of political events in Iraq, a vocal emphasis on Iran's nuclear program, skillful use of politically incorrect (at times, seemingly maniacal) statements by Ahmadinejad, the activation of regional proxies and, above all, patience. Stratfor has explored many of these tactics in detail before, but we will recap them here briefly as the strategy, viewed in full, is quite something to behold.

Let's begin with the most potent part of the strategy (both politically and militarily): the nuclear program.

Iran clearly has used this as a bargaining chip in the back channel dealings over Iraq. Rather than pursuing a covert nuclear program -- which has been the logical course if obtaining nuclear weapons were truly Iran's primary goal in the beginning -- the Iranians made a conscious decision to tout their nuclear advances publicly. Their political and energy partners in Moscow and Beijing routinely have played defense, ensuring that the nuclear issue languishes in the U.N. Security Council. And Tehran has made sure to crank up the rhetoric whenever political developments in Iraq take an unfavorable turn -- while always staying clear of the red line (beyond which the United States or Israel could be expected to mount pre-emptive strikes). This tactic has helped shape perceptions of Iran as a force to be reckoned with, while keeping Washington and its allies off balance in negotiations over Iraq. And, significantly, nuclear weapons no longer appear to be a red herring tactic, but an end of themselves for Tehran.

Closely related to this has been the image campaign for Ahmadinejad, who has been carefully and purposely branded in the public mind as an utter lunatic. The nearly unknown, populist mayor from Tehran was captured in the public spotlight during Iran's 2005 summer election season. Before the world could even begin to form an opinion of him, he began threatening to wipe Israel off the map, labeling the Holocaust an enormous lie and so forth. As North Korea's experiments with the "crazy fearsome cripple gambit" have showed, an otherwise weak state -- headed by a seemingly wild-eyed leader who just might be mad enough to launch some of the nukes that the state may or may not actually possess -- can gain useful concessions, if not respect, from the rest of the world. And in Iran's case, it certainly made Israel and the United States to think twice about whether to attempt any military adventures concerning the Islamic Republic.

Tehran has shown itself equally effective in its use of militant proxies in the region.

The financial, ideological, political and military support of Iran has helped Hezbollah build a strong following among the mostly poor Shiite population of southern Lebanon. Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the Shiite militant group was left languishing -- provoking the occasional border skirmish with Israel as a way of maintaining its credibility. But over the summer, while the world was focused on Iraq, Hezbollah roared back to life in a conflict that went well beyond a border skirmish.

There is reason to believe Iran had a hand in igniting that conflict. In early July, when long-range missiles began raining down on Haifa, sources within Hezbollah hinted to Stratfor that the launch had taken them by surprise -- indicating something more than a routine kidnapping of Israeli soldiers that garnered unintended consequences. Hezbollah forces certainly took a beating during the 34-day conflict, but the important point is that the militant group successfully resisted the Israeli military.

This outcome has purchased long-term benefits for both Hezbollah and Iran. On the micro level, it has attracted new levels of support for Hezbollah and engendered a new sense of confidence within the movement -- which is now moving to expand its political clout through massive street demonstrations in Beirut, designed to bring down the government controlled by its opponents. On the macro level, the outcome of the conflict left Israel in military and political paralysis -- providing Iran with even more room to maneuver politically within the region.

In addition to Hezbollah, Iran has kept in close touch with its Shiite proxies in Bahrain and Kuwait -- a quiet reminder to Sunni Arab states in the region that Tehran retains the means to destabilize their neighborhoods, as it did Israel's, should circumstances compel it. Iran's rising influence in the region has put the Arab regimes on a defensive footing, and some are now questioning the wisdom of strategies that rely on U.S. military strength to secure their interests. It is for this reason, then, that Saudi Arabia is now hinting it will step up support for Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have announced plans to launch a joint nuclear program (ostensibly for civilian energy purposes). The Sunni states lack strong military capabilities of their own, but will shout as loudly as possible to make it clear to the United States that they will not sit idly by while Iran recasts the region's balance of power in favor of the Shia.

All of these tactics, of course, hit around the periphery of what is really the first and most crucial issue: Iraq. It is there that Iran's political manipulations, its use of proxies and its great patience -- as the poor position of U.S. troops and of the U.S. president both grew increasingly evident -- have come into play. And with its growing confidence in the region, Iran seemingly has become less inclined to settle for merely a friendly or neutral government in Baghdad. Instead, it wants control.

As expected, October turned out to be a particularly deadly month for U.S. forces in Iraq, with Iran helping to fuel attacks by its Shiite militant proxies. These Iranian-sponsored rebels are an assortment of militants, many of whom received training from Hezbollah cadres in Lebanon. Iran also has enlisted rogue elements from Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's movement to aid in this effort. The timing of the uptick in American casualties played into the U.S. political cycle -- as the Iranians could have predicted -- and contributed to the Republican upset in November's U.S. congressional elections. At the same time, already loud demands for the Bush administration to shift course or construct a real policy for Iraq gained even greater volume.

In keeping with the strategy, Washington now is feeling pressure from all sides to engage Tehran -- and, crucially, the Iranians have had to sacrifice nothing to achieve this position."

It's funny the way, when things are going well, we call it the "end of history" and when things are going poorly, we call it "the end of the Pax Americana."

Is there a place for somewhere-in-the-middle journalism?

German Word of the Day

der Amoklauf = the amok running

This article in Der Spiegel is really hilarious. Another quote: "Wolfowitz ist das Schulbuchbeispiel für das Nebeneinander von Klugheit und Dummheit." ("Wolfowitz is the schoolbook example of the coexistence of cleverness and stupidness.") The article also comes with these great, People magazine-style photos. Peep America's hottest neo-cons--not only are they "stupidly clever", but wildly ugly!

One of the funnier headlines I've seen on Bolton's resignation and the twilight of the neo-conservative moment. It translates, literally, as "Bye-bye concrete-heads!"

I just stumbled across the final report of the Princeton Project on National Security. Reflects in great part some of the ideas presented in this space, although I am wary of some of its perk optimism. It seems that the world this project seeks to recapture has all but disappeared: the United States, sadly, is simply not the same country it was before 9/11 and Bush. And it will take more than one presidency to chage it.

Despite my expressed misgivings over the wisdom of troop withdrawal in this space, I woke up today somewhat dissapointed to this news. At the very least, the discussion of withdrawal could have forced the President to explain how his approach would provide real results. Instead, we get more of the pathological resistance to change that got us into this quagmire in the first place.