Somalia
Those pushing the idea of Somalia as the new Afghanistan are failing to take into account two important facts: first, the UIC's stated ambivalence to the ends of Al Qaeda and second, the Ethiopia factor: Ethiopia simply will not allow a full-blown Islamist state to emerge on its eastern border. With that said, I believe this war with Ethiopia, if the UIC emerges alive, will be enough to fully radicalize it into a Taliban-style faction, particularly if the U.S. openly supports Ethiopia. Indeed, it will be interesting to see how much this war, which is developing as I write, will become the new jihad of vogue, with foreign fighters streaming in to help the embattled Somalis. While Bin Laden did recently include Darfur on his list of sites of interest to the global jihadist, Al Qaeda--as far as I'm aware--hasn't had much of a presence in East Africa since Bin Laden's exile fronm Sudan in 1996. But if Bin Laden does help the UIC fight Ethiopia, it's likely that Al Qaeda will be granted some degree of operational freedom and security within Somalia in the years to come. Even more interesting, as I've commented in this space before, the UIC has been sending men to Lebanon to be trained by Hezbollah. The secular government at Baidoa obviously needs our support, but the extent to which this translates into outright support for Ethiopia must be carefully considered. If we do support Ethiopia (I don't think we have a choice) we must do so subtly. At best, this scenario promises an extremely bloody and nasty regional war in the Horn of Africa. At worst, it promises an extremely bloody and nasty regional war in the Horn of Africa with an isolated, bitter, and devastated Islamist Somalia emerging out of its ashes, mindful of how the U.S. helped contribute to its destruction.
posted by James at 11:48 AM
1 Comments:
qiYour lucid analysis of the delicate political situation that both the Somali government and the United States face is based on two key presumptions. First, the Somali government has control over key geographic areas in Somalia. These Islamist groups are mobilized throughout the country, particularly in areas near the border with Ethopia. To the extent that Al-Qaeda exerts influence in Somalia, these Islamist groups are already radicalized. They certainly do not need additional Al-Qaeda support to push over the edge. Second, you assume that the Ethopian government's military is capable of crippling Islamist insurgent military capabilities. The military equation would be the same as it is in Afghanistan and Iraq in spite of the geographical difference. In fact, an Ethopian-Islamist group conflict would likely spiral into a guerrilla war without a clear end in sight and undermine what little control the centralized Somali government currently holds. Lastly, as far as U.S. support for the government is concerned, I agree that we must support the Ethopian government as a matter of principle. The problem remains how should the U.S. support the Ethopian government. It is unclear that military support would help. Surely, American domestic politics would not support deployment of U.S. troops in Somalia, a la, Black Hawk Down in the early 1990s. Furthermore, it is unclear that U.S. economic support would enhance the Ethopian government's position. You use the term "subtle" support regarding the way by which the U.S. supports the Ethopian government, especially as any overt U.S. support would undermine our credibility in Somalia. Again,that argument, while true, is moot at this point. U.S. credibility in Somalia is already-- and has been for the last two decades-- nil. Therefore, the crucial issue facing the Ethopian government-- as well as the United States AND Europe-- is how to combat Islamist groups' influence in Somalian politics. Poverty, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the pervasion and proliferation of Al-Qaeda/Islamist group ideology has created a barrier that presupposes not cooperating with the U.S. and its allies. I don't know the answer to this one. For certain, the consequences of any decisions made by the Ethopian and secular Somali governments has serious implications for U.S. foreign policy maneuverability in Africa and the Middle East.
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